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PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff-Appellant First American Commerce Company 
is a Utah general partnership of which W. Claude Smith, Francis H. 
Suitter, James R. Dickson, Jr., Sam D. Battistone are partners. 
Westam Properties, a Utah general partnership, is one of the 
general partners of First America Commerce Company but is not 
named as a party herein. 
2. Plaintiffs-Appellants W. Claude Smith, Francis H. 
Suitter, J. Renee Suitter, James R. Dickson. Jr., Sam D. 
Battistone, Carla Nan Battistone, Merrill Turnbow, Kurt Larsen, 
Sandra Lynn Larsen, Glenn A. Powell and Carol A. Powell are 
individual accommodation makers of the Deed of Trust Note with 
limited liability. 
Hereinafter, plaintiffs will be collectively referred to 
as "First American" or "Plaintiffs." 
3. Defendant-Respondent Washington Mutual Savings Bank 
(hereinafter "Washington Mutual") is the holder of the Deed of 
Trust Note and the assignee of the Deed of Trust with Assignment 
of Rents (Security Agreement included) and other loan documents. 
4. Defendant-Respondent First Security Realty Services 
Corporation is the indorser and assignor of the Deed of Trust 
Note, Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents (Security Agreement 
included), and other loan documents. 
Subsequent to the acts giving rise to this lawsuit, First 
Security Realty Services Corporation changed its name to Crossland 
Mortgage Company. For purposes of this appeal, the company will 
still be referred to as "First Security." 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Where ii Ttut:,i Deed defines "Beneficiary" as "the owner 
and holder of l he Note" secured h, il TIU,I IH-MI, mini the 
lender's interests in the Note and Trust Deed are assigned with 
knowledge ami ennsen! nf I he deliiei IIDP1, the assignor remain 
liable for performance ot whatever obligations Bener iciai y \\\ \) 
h a v e under the Trust Deed? 
This i? an i 
Third Judical , 7'; -e ' 
c 
misrepresent ai J *.. « „ 
Course ot Proceedings Below 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
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detendaii t riLoL dcuui.xi> except a 
assignment of its interest in the loan to Washington Mutual, it had 
no further obligation or liability with regard to the matters of 
which Plaintiffs complain. 
By order dated July 9, 1986, the district court granted 
First Security's motion to dismiss except as to Plaintiffs' Fourth 
Cause of Action, a claim for misrepresentation. 
On July 29, 1986, First American filed a Petition for 
Review with this court seeking permission to take an interlocutory 
appeal from the district court's order. 
On September 2, 1986, this court granted First American's 
petition. 
Statement of Facts 
Appellant First American is the owner of a commercial 
building and parking facility known as the First American Commerce 
Building ("the Building"). On August 29, 1984, First Security 
entered into loan agreements with Plaintiffs, including a 
promissory note for $5,700,000 (the "Note"), which Note was secured 
by a Deed of Trust, Assignment of Leases and Rents, and UCC filings 
(collectively referred to as the "Loan Documents"). At closing, 
the Note was indorsed and the Loan Documents were assigned to 
Washington Mutual. 
Actually, First American always contemplated obtaining a 
loan from Washington Mutual and dealt with it directly before the 
loan was made. Thus, application for permanent financing requested 
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Finally, at closing, a settlement statement, prepared by 
the title company and signed on behalf of First American, listed 
only Washington Mutual as "Lender". (R.64) Once the loan was 
closed, funding came solely from Washington Mutual by wire transfer 
from Seattle (R.60). 
The causes of action which were dismissed by the court 
below (R.203), Plaintiffs' First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth and 
Seventh Causes of Action, involved claims that First Security 
failed to perform its "obligations" under the Trust Deed to wit: 
acting upon Plaintiffs' request for the approval of a proposed 
tenant lease requiring alterations to the Building and the 
disbursement of tenant improvement funds per the standards set 
forth in the Trust Deed. (R. 5-12). Each one of these 
obligations, if such they were, was owed by "Beneficiary" under the 
Trust Deed. Section 1.17 of the Trust Deed states that "[t]he term 
'Beneficiary' shall mean the owner and holder of the Note, whether 
or not named as Beneficiary herein." (R. 162) Following the 
execution of the Assignment and the indorsement of the Note by 
First Security to Washington Mutual (R. 67), which were 
accomplished with the knowledge and consent of Appellant, 
Washington Mutual was at all times, and continues to be, the sole 
owner and holder of the Note. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellants urge an incorrect standard of review upon this 
court and, under the correct standard, have failed to establish a 
genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. 
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By the express terms of the Trust Deed, Beneficiary is 
defined as "the owner and holder of the Note." Washington Mutual, 
being the sole owner and holder of the Note, is the sole 
Beneficiary under the Trust Deed and the only party capable of 
performing the duties of which Plaintiffs complain and the only 
party liable for any breach of duty. 
Plaintiffs rely on the principle of contract law that a 
party cannot, by an assignment of the contract, relieve itself of 
its obligations thereunder to support their argument that First 
Security retained its obligations as Beneficiary notwithstanding 
the Assignment. Although a correct statement of general contract 
law, this principle has no application in the context of a contract 
whose subject is the security for a loan. Once a secured party 
transfers its interest in the debt, it also, as a matter of law, 
transfers its interest in the security for the debt. As First 
Security no longer held any interest in the subject property, it 
could not retain the duties of a secured party with respect to such 
property. The trial court's judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims 
against First Security should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS URGE UPON THE COURT AN INCORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
Appellant, citing Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 300 
(Utah 1978), argues that in reviewing the record on appeal, "this 
court must treat the evidence First American submitted as the only 
credible evidence and affirm the summary judgment only if no issues 
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of fact which could affect the outcome can be discerned." 
Appellants' Brief at 6. Such is not the law of Utah. The reported 
decision in Blodgett v. Martsch is an opinion signed only by 
Justice Maughan. Chief Justice Ellett concurred in the result, 
Justice Crockett concurred by separate opinion, and Justice Hall, 
joined by Justice Wilkins, concurred with reservation by separate 
opinion. None of the other opinions explicitly adopted the 
questionable standard of review. Thus, the decision is not 
authority for the standard of review. Indeed, this Court, in a 
later opinion held that, in reviewing a summary judgment, the 
Supreme Court must consider the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the losing party, and affirm only where it appears 
that there is no genuine issue of material fact, or where, even 
according to the facts as contended by the losing party, the moving 
party is entitled to summary judgment as as a matter of law. Themy 
v. Seagull Enterprises Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979). First 
Security submits that this case satisfies those conditions and thus 
the District Court's decision granting partial summary judgment 
should be affirmed. 
II. PLAINTIFFS RAISED NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT BEFORE THE 
DISTRICT COURT. 
There can be no dispute as to any of the material facts 
presented above. They are clearly set forth in documents 
presented to the court below. Plaintiffs do not quibble with the 
documents; instead, their Brief obfuscates by pointing to the 
affidavit of Mr. Merrill Turnbow, quoting the following assertion: 
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Although plaintiff First American Commerce 
Company was aware that First American Commerce 
made an assignment with respect to the subject 
loan to Washington Mutual, neither First American 
nor any other plaintiff agreed to release First 
Security from any of its obligations under the 
loan documents, nor did any of them enter into a 
novation of any of the loan documents. At all 
times plaintiffs have considered, and still do 
consider, First Security to be the lender on the 
subject loan and to be fully responsible to meet 
all of its obligations stated in the loan 
documents. 
Plaintiffs' Brief at p. 9. Plaintiffs argue that this affidavit, 
with nothing more, shows that Plaintiffs neither released First 
Security from the obligations under the Loan Documents nor entered 
into a novation, and that "there was no evidence to the contrary." 
These arguments, even if viewed as "credible" in the light 
most favorable to plaintiffs, offer no reason to upset the District 
Court's ruling. An affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment must set forth facts that would be admissible into 
evidence. Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983). The only 
fact in the quoted portion of the Turnbow affidavit is an admission 
that First American was aware of the Assignment of the loan by 
First Security to Washington Mutual. Interestingly, in its Brief 
to this Court (p.3), and contrary to its pleading (R.4), Appellant 
has for the first time admitted that it consented to such 
Assignment. Whether or not there was a release of First Security 
or a novation is not a fact, but a legal conclusion which is for 
the court, not the Appellants, to decide. Finally, the role in 
which First American views First Security, without any evidence of 
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communications to that effect, is merely another opinion. Bare 
contentions, unsupported by any specification of facts in support 
thereof, raise no material questions of fact as will preclude the 
entry of summary judgment. Massey v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 
937, 938 (Utah 1980). 
In short, in response to unambiguous documents in the 
record and before the court below, Appellant has offered opinions 
of the legal impact of those documents. Besides the fact that 
these opinions are not facts, Plaintiffs' unstated intentions as to 
the meaning of the documents are irrelevant. Interpretation of a 
contract is a question of law to be determined by the Court. E.g., 
Morris v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 658 P.2d 1199 
(Utah 1983). As there are thus no material facts at issue, this 
Court must then decide whether the District Court correctly ruled 
that, as a matter of law, First Security was entitled to partial 
summary judgment. 
III. FIRST SECURITY WAS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. Under the Clear Language of the Trust Deed, Washington 
Mutual Supplanted First Security as the Beneficiary. 
As noted above, interpretation of a contract's language 
is a matter of law to be decided by the court. Under the clear 
and unambiguous language of Section 1.17 of the Trust Deed, the 
Beneficiary is defined as "the owner and holder of the Note." 
At the closing, after the Loan Documents were executed, 
First Security indorsed the Note (R.67) and assigned the Loan 
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Documents (R.22) to Washington Mutual. The unconditional 
Assignment made Washington Mutual the owner of the Note; the 
indorsement and delivery of the Note made Washington Mutual the 
holder. Utah Code. Ann. § 70A-3-202. Being the owner and holder 
of the Note made Washington Mutual the only party that could be 
deemed "Beneficiary" of the Trust Deed. 
First American, however, argues that notwithstanding the 
fact of Washington Mutual's being the Beneficiary under the Trust 
Deed and notwithstanding First Security's assigning all of its 
right, title and interest in the Loan Documents, First Security 
retained its obligations to First American under the Loan 
Documents, and thus remains liable for breach of these 
obligations. The District Court correctly rejected such an 
argument. 
B. The General Contract Principle Relied On By Appellant Is 
Inapplicable To This Case. 
In support of its argument, Plaintiffs cite the general 
contract principle that a party to a contract cannot relieve itself 
of its obligations under the contract merely by assigning the 
contract to a third person; to do so requires a release by the 
other party to the contract or a novation. Although the District 
Court could well have held as a matter of law that a novation 
occurred, it did not, and did not need to do so, because the 
general principle is inapplicable in this case. In view of 
plaintiffs' studied refusal to acknowledge that they always looked 
to Washington Mutual as the lender rather than to First Security, a 
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brief word about novation is instructive in disposing of 
Plaintiffs' insistence upon suing First Security. 
This Court has held a novation (which has been defined as 
"the replacement of an unexpired contract by another contract 
reached through renegotiation, or the substitution of a new party 
with the concurrent release of an original party from liability," 
Williams Petroleum Co. v. Midland Cooperatives, Inc., 679 F.2d 815, 
819 (10th Cir. 1982)) need not be express or written, but could be 
implied from the facts and circumstances surrounding the trans-
action. Robison v. Hansen, 594 P.2d 867 (Utah 1979). Given the 
undisputed facts, as shown by the documents in the record cited 
herein concerning Plaintiffs' dealings with Washington Mutual prior 
to the loan, Appellant's knowledge of and consent to First 
Security's immediate assignment of the loan to Washington Mutual at 
closing, and Washington Mutual's funding of the loan, the District 
Court would have been within its powers to have found an implied 
novation, with Washington Mutual substituting as lender, thereby 
releasing First Security from its obligations under the Loan 
Documents. 
Had the District Court made such a finding, Plaintiffs, 
even under the argument presented in their Brief, would have to 
agree that the District Court correctly dismissed their claims 
against First Security. The court did not need to make such a 
finding, however, because by its assignment of the Loan Documents, 
First Security was released from the obligations that Plaintiffs 
claims were breached by operation of law. 
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Each of the cases cited by Appellant involves a bilateral 
contract whereby one party is to provide a service or a product to 
another in return for payment. Upon assigning its right to 
payment, the party that was to provide the product or service 
remains liable for breached obligations concerning the service or 
product, unless it obtained a release from the party with whom it 
originally contracted. See Cuchine v. H. 0. Bell, Inc., 682 P.2d 
723 (Mont. 1984) (retail installment sale of truck); Mt. Wheeler 
Power, Inc. v. Gallagher, 653 P.2d 1212 (Nev. 1982) (sale of 
electricity); Smith v. Wrehe, 261 N.W.2d 620 (Neb. 1978) (sale of 
taxicab company); D. A. Taylor Co. v. Paulson, 552 P.2d 1274 (Utah 
1976) (sale of carpet); Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. Famous Music 
Corp., 557 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1977) (royalty agreement concerning 
recording and record distribution contract); Missouri Pacific 
Railroad Company v. Rental Storage and Transit Company, 524 S.W.2d 
898 (Mo. App. 1975) (agreement between railroad company and 
shippers concerning use of tracks). The purpose for such contracts 
is to ensure that one party is provided a service or product, and 
that the other party is paid. In such cases, it is entirely 
appropriate that the party that originally promised to provide the 
service or product remains liable on its obligations to do so, even 
though it has assigned its rights to payment. 
This case, however, involves a completely different sort 
of contract. Here (even assuming arguendo that First Security 
funded the loan and then assigned it to Washington Mutual), 
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Beneficiary (First Security) loans money to Trustor (First 
American), and in return is granted a lien on property owned by 
Trustor. The contract at issue here, the Trust Deed, concerns the 
parties' obligations to each other concerning treatment and use of 
collateral, in this case the Building. Thus, for example, the 
Trust Deed states that Trustor will not sell, transfer or alter the 
Building, or any part thereof, without Beneficiary's consent. 
Correspondingly, Beneficiary will not unreasonably withhold its 
consent to proposals by Trustor to sell, transfer or alter the 
collateral. The first provision is designed to protect Beneficiary 
by insuring that its debtor's fee interest to the Building will not 
disappear, and that the Building will not be rendered less valuable 
by virtue of alteration before the debt is paid. The second 
provision is intended to protect Trustor; since it is in possession 
of the Building, and is operating it, it must be able to use the 
collateral in a reasonable fashion without Beneficiary's 
unreasonable interference in that use. 
In short, these provisions are designed to insure that 
Trustor will continue to protect the collateral, and Beneficiary 
will not unreasonably "overprotect" the collateral. There is no 
payment for either service; the obligations, and the contract 
itself, only have meaning insofar as they relate to collateral 
securing a loan. Stated another way, the only parties that have 
obligations to each other concerning the collateral must be holders 
of rights in that collateral: the owner and the secured party. 
Appellants argue that when the secured party unconditionally 
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assigns its interest in the loan, thereby transferring its interest 
in the security for that loan, UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-35, the 
original lender retains its obligations under the security 
agreement to the debtor not to "overprotect" the collateral. This 
is illogical, because the original lender no longer holds any 
rights in the collateral to "overprotect". The fact that the Trust 
Deed in this case specifically defines Beneficiary as "the holder 
and owner of the Note" only serves to reinforce the logic of the 
notion that only insofar as a secured party retains rights in 
collateral does it retain obligations concerning treatment of such 
collateral to the grantor of the security interest. 
Decisions in analogous fact situations, namely federally 
insured mortgages, where in order to collect the insurance proceeds 
the original lender/mortgagee must assign its rights in the 
mortgage to the agency/insurer, support this proposition. In 
Marcus Garvey Square, Inc. v. Winston Burnett Construction Co. of 
California, Inc., 595 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1979), an owner of a 
housing project brought suit against a general contractor seeking 
damages for late construction. The contractor (Burnett), in turn, 
counterclaimed and crossclaimed against the owner, the mortgage 
lender, and several federal agencies seeking to recover the balance 
allegedly due under the construction contract. Under federal 
statutory law, in order to receive its mortgage insurance benefits, 
the mortgage lender, Home Savings and Loan, Inc., assigned the 
mortgage to the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development. In affirming the lower court's grant of summary 
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judgment for Home Savings against the contractor's claims, the 
Ninth Circuit stated: 
[T]he district court was correct in granting 
summary judgment in favor of Home. All Home's 
rights and interests arising under this mortgage 
have been assigned to the Secretary [of HUD], 12 
U.S.C., § 1713(g), as incorporated by 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1715z-3(a)(2). Whatever claims Burnett has 
against Home must be asserted against the 
Secretary; Home is no longer liable to suit upon 
them. (Emphasis added). 
595 F.2d at 1133. Likewise, in Trans-Bay Engineers & Builders, 
Inc. v. Hills, 551 F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the D.C. Circuit 
upheld the dismissal of claims to recover "holdback" funds brought 
by a general contractor against the mortgagee and the Secretary of 
Housing and Urban Development. The mortgagee had assigned its 
interest in the loan documents to HUD. The opinion states: 
The District Court correctly dismissed all 
counts against the Advance Mortgage Corp. 
Advance assigned the mortgage and the Building 
Loan Agreement to HUD on December 24, 1974, and 
thereby transferred all rights and interests 
arising under the mortgage to HUD, pursuant to 12 
U.S.C. § 1713(g). HUD is in a position to 
advance any arguments that Advance might have 
presented in this case, and HUD admits that it is 
bound as a successor in interest to honor any 
obligations owed by Advance. 
551 F.2d at 383. See also F. W. Eversley & Co., Inc. v. East New 
York Non-Profit HDFC, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 791, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) 
(summary judgment granted in favor of mortgagee who had assigned 
loan documents to government; mortgagee "no longer liable"); Lindy 
v. Lynn, 395 F. Supp. 769, 773 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd 515 F.2d 507 
(3rd Cir. 1975) (following assignment of mortgage to Secretary of 
HUD, the "Secretary is now the alter ego of the mortgagee and as 
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such is clothed with all the rights and obligations contained in 
the aforementioned agreements." (Emphasis added)). 
In all of these cases, the assignment of the mortgage was 
sufficient to sustain summary judgment for the assignor/mortgagee 
on claims relating to duties under the mortgage. None of these 
opinions follows the general rule relied on by Plaintiffs because 
it makes no sense to do so. The logical party that would have 
obligations to a debtor relating to the debtor's use of pledged 
property is the party that has rights in that collateral, i.e., 
the secured party. 
The facts of this case amply demonstrate the fallacy of 
Appellant's argument. Appellant contends that First Security is 
liable because it unreasonably withheld its consent to a lease on 
the property securing the loan. Putting aside the question of 
whether the Beneficiary's consent to such a lease was necessary at 
all, to imply such an obligation on First Security would fly in 
the face of the Loan Documents, the Assignment, logic, and common 
sense. First Security's consent to such a lease would be 
meaningless because it no longer held any rights in the property 
being leased. After closing, Washington Mutual was the only party 
who held a lien on the Building and thus was the only party whose 
consent concerning a lease could make any difference to First 
American. 
For these reasons, Washington Mutual is the sole party of 
whom Fist American can complain for the alleged failures to 
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approve a tenant lease and to disburse tenant improvement funds 
pursuant to the Trust Deed. 
CONCLUSION 
The undisputed facts in the case are that First Security 
signed the Loan Documents, including a Note and Trust Deed, with 
Plaintiffs. First Security, with the knowledge and consent of 
Plaintiffs, immediately and unconditionally indorsed the Note and 
assigned all of its right, title and interest in and to such Loan 
Documents to Washington Mutual. The Trust Deed provides for 
certain obligations on the part of Beneficiary, which is defined 
in the Trust Deed as the holder and owner of the Note. At all 
times following the assignment by First Security, Washington 
Mutual has been the sole holder and owner of the Note, and thus 
the sole Beneficiary under the Trust Deed. 
As there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, 
and since by operation of law First Security was relieved of its 
obligations under the Trust Deed upon its indorsement of the Note 
and assignment of the Loan Documents to Washington Mutual, the 
District Court's granting of partial summary judgment for First 
Security should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this IJih day of February, 1987. 
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Attorneys for Respondent 
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